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PROOF OF FOREIGN LAW.
dressed. Lord Mansfield and his associates had twice decided that
it could. Mr. Justice Story and the Supreme Court of the United
States had followed suit, and it was confessed that those decisions
of the King's Bench had never been overruled. Yet it appeared on
the oaths of such men as Pollock and Hill, that this was no longer
the law, and indeed never had been law but during Mansfield's
presidency, and the fact was decided accordingly.
What would have been the effect of Mr. Justice Story attempting
to ascertain from books the law of England, on a subject that he
probably deemed himself as well informed on as any English judge ?
Why merely to make a man liable under a contract which by the
law of the land never existed. So in a case of the greatest practi-
cal importance, the right of a pledgee to tack a subsequent advance,
the same learned judge, 2 Story's Equity, sec. 1034, evidently lay-
ing down the English rule, for eighteen English decisions and but one
American are cited, is so wide of the mark, that when the point
really came up for discussion in Chilton vs. Carrington, 15 Com.
Bench, 102, counsel familiar with their municipal law could not
cite one of his eighteen authorities in support of the proposition,
nor would the court hear an argument against the alleged rule, so
utterly was it without foundation in their law.
When, therefore, we find, that even such a writer as Kent cannot
make himself sufficiently clear to a Scotch jurist, to enable him
to give an outline of the American law not absolute nonsense, and
that so anxious a seeker for English law as Mr. Justice Story,
should have fallen into such palpable blunders on such apparently
plain and practical questions, it really seems that it would be safer
to proceed in the old way of ascertaining facts, by inquiring of
competent witnesses under oath, rather than trust to the chance of
the jadg2's knowledge, either acquired or intuitive.
LIABILITY OF AGENT OF KNOWN PRINCIPAL.
It seems curious that the liability of an a.-cnt on contracts
entered i-) by h~m on behalf of a known principal should be so
oftt-n a matter of doubt as it is. Contracts of this sort are of every
day occurrence, and- it may be assumed the agent knows whether he
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intends to pledge himself personally or not; yet every term cases
arise in which the effect of the agreement is as much disputed as if
there could be no certainty in the meaning of English words. A
review of the recent cases upon this point may therefore be of some
practical interest.
There never was any doubt, that where an agent contracts in his
own name, without stating that he has a principal, or without dis-
closing the name of his principal, the other party to the contract
might hold him personally liable. 2 Smith's L. 0. 223; Franklyn
vs. Lamond, 4 C. B. 637. The rule has even gone further; for
where a party on the face of the agreement said that he contracted
as agent for the freighter, (not naming him,) and stipulated, that
"the agreement being concluded on behalf of another party, all
responsibility on his part should cease on the cargo being shipped,"
it was held, that when he turned out to be really the principal he
might be treated as'such, because the limitation only applied to him
in his character-as agent, and it involved no contradiction of the
written document to suppose that he might contract as agent for the
freighter, whoever that freighter might be, and might still adopt
the character of freighter himself if he chose. Schmalz vs. Avery,
16 Q. B. 655. But in such a case it rests on the party who wishes
to fix him with personal liability to negative the assertion that he
is agent. Therefore, where on a similar form of agreement, the
evidence failed to prove that the defendant was principal, it was
held that he was not responsible. Carr vs. Jackson, 7 Exch. 382.
There is much greater difficulty, however, where the party not
only states that he is an agent, but mentions the name of his prin-
cipal. The cases upon this point may be divided into two classes-
first, those in which the professing agent had no authority to bind
his assumed principal; and, secondly, those in which he had.
On the first state of facts the following rules may be laid down:
Where the agent has contracted on the faith of an authority which
once existed, but which has ceased, and of whose cessation he has
no means of knowledge, he is not liable. The well known case of
Smout vs. ilberry, 10 12. & W. 1, settled that point. On the other
hand, he will be personally responsible where he never had any
authority; and in such a case it makes no difference whether he
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fraudulently misrepresented his authority with intent to deceive, or
without fraud, assumed an authority which he did not know to ex-
ist, or even acted upon authority which he bona fide believed to be
vested in him, as in the case of agents acting upon forged warrants
of attorney which are supposed to be genuine. Per Cur., 10 M. &
W. 9, 10. And then the further question arises, how is the agent,
when liable, to be sued ? A dictum of Bayley, B., is reported, (2
Cr. & M. 530, note a,) to the effect, that in such case the agent
may be sued on the contract ; and so it is held in some of the States-
of America. Story on Agency 226. But this doctrine was im-
pliedly denied in Polill vs. Walter, 3 B. & Ad. 114, and has been
directly overruled in later cases. It is now laid down, that where
it clearly and expressly appears that a person, really acting as
agent, contracts as such agent in the name of his principal, profes-
sing and intending to bind his principal only, he cannot himself be
sued upon the contract as if he were a party to the instrument;
though it would be different if, though professing to be agent, he
were in fact the principal. Jenkins vs. Hutchinson, 13 Q. B. 744;
Lewis vs. Nicholson, 21 L. J., Q. B. 311. The remedy against an
agent, who contracts as such without authority, may be either by an
action on the case for a false representation of authority, or by an
action on an implied contract for the existence of the authority
which he professes to have. But to say that lie is personally
liable upon a contract which he really makes as agent would be to
make a contract, instead of construing that which the parties thcm-
selves have made. Lewis vs. Nicholson, ubi sup.
Some of the decisiuns upon bills of exchange illustrate this doc-
trine. In Pouhill vs. JMalter, before referred to, the defendant ac-
cepted a bill by procuration of the drawee, believing that the latter
would sanction his act, which lie did not. It was held that he could
not be sued upon the acceptance, as no one could be liable as ac-
ceptor but the person to whom the bill is addressed, unless lie be
an acceptor for honor. Two later cases, apparently at variance, arc
not really so. In one a bill was directed to " The A. C. lining
Co.," and was accepted " For the A. C. Mining Co., W.Van Uster,
manager." Owen vs. 'Mz U;ter, 10 C. II. 318. In the other,
the bill was addressed to "J. D., purser, W. D. Mining Co.," and
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accepted by him in the terms, "J. D., accepted per proc. W. D.
Mining Co." Nicholls vs. Diamond, 9 Exch. 154. In neither
case was the acceptor authorized to accept, and in both he was held
liable; but this was on the express ground, that as in both cases he
was a member of the company, his acceptance, was in fact, an un-
dertaking on his own behalf and that of others. He could not bind
the others, but he was not the less bound himself. It was admitted
that were it not for this fact he would not be responsible as a party
to the bill.
The second state of things, however, is much more common-that,
*namely, in which the agent is really authorized to contract, but
does so in such a manner that a claim is set up against him indi-
vidually. "In this, as in all similar cases, whether the agent con-
tracted as agent or not is a question of fact, and not a conclusion of
law. Each case must depend on its own circumstances." Per
Willes, J., in G-een' vs. Kopke, 2 Jur., N. S. part 1, p. 1050. It
may, however, be possible to deduce some general principles from
the decisions on this subject..
Iii the first place, a party who contracts in his own name by seal
will always be liable, though he states that he contracts on behalf
of another, Appleton vs. Binks, 5 East, 148, because no one can be
sued upon the covenant but himself. But even where the contract
is not under sea], the agent will not be secured by stating in the
body of the agreement that he contracts on behalf of, or as solici-
tor of, a third party, if he signs simply in his own name. "Prima
facie, a party who signs his own name must be taken as the con-
tracting party, unless there is something very strong in the contract
to release him. Per Cresswell, J., in Cooke vs. Wilson, 2 Jur., N.
S. part i, p. 1095; Burrell vs. Jones, 3 B. & Al. 47. And the
inference of personal liability will be rendered irresistible if the
contract contains some stipulations which are to be performed by
the defendant individually; Taner vs. Christian, 4 El. & 131. 591,
Cooke vs. Wilson, ubi sup., or if it is so framed that the supposed
principals are not bound by it, so that there would be no remedy
against any one if the agents are not liable. Wilson vs. Zuleta,
14 Q. B. 405. On the other hand, even .where a contract, ex-
pressed to be made on behalf of another, was signed by the defend-
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ant in his own name; he was held not to be personally bound, where
the act stipulated for could only be done by his principal, Lewis vs.
Nicholson, 21 L. J., Q. B. 311, and where, upon the whole contract,
coupled with the previous negotiations, it appeared to be the under-
standing of the parties that he only entered into the undertaking as
agent. .Downman vs. Williams, 7 Q. B. 103.
It is in general conclusive in favor of the defendant, that he has
signed per procuration, or on behalf of, or as agent for, the pro-
fessed principal. Per Cresswell, J., in Cooke vs. Wilson, ubi sup.;
-Ex parte Buckley, 14 M. & W. 469; Jenkins vs. Hutchinson, 13
Q. B. 744. And in such a case it makes no difference that the
principal is a foreigner residing abroad. The question is still one
of intention, to be gathered from the circumstances appearing on
the contract; and although, where the seller deals with an agent
resident in the country, and acting for a foreign principal, the pre-
sumption is that the seller does not contract with the foreigner, and
trust him, but with the party with whom he makes the bargain,
still this is a presumption of law and not of fact, and cannot be set
up against the plain words of the contract. Green vs. Kopke, 2
Jur., N. S., part 1, p. 1049; Hahony vs. KYekulJ, 14 C. B. 390.
Even in the last-named case, however, the defendant will be
treated as principal, if it would be a contradiction of the entire
agreement to treat him as agent. A charter party stated to be
made between the plaintiffs and defendants, went on in the usual
way, without any intimation that the defendants were not the prin-
cipals, till at the end it was signed by them, "by authority of and
as agents for, S. of Memel." They were held personally liable.
Lord Campbell, C. J. and Coleridge, J. seemed to attach a different
degree of weight to the fact that the alleged principals were for-
eigners. Both agreed that as the defendants were contracting par-
ties, by whom it was agreed that every thing was to be done, they
were personally bound and that the concluding words were only
intended for tl- lir security, as between themselves and S. Lennard
vs. 17lembi.g, i El. & B1. 125. And so, where a bill bf exchange
r-asz stated to be for goods supplied to the adventurers of the 11.
.tiues, and was addressed to the defendant, and accepted by him,
'Por the companies, W. Charles, purser," it was held that lie was
